

LETTERS

Training For Maneuver

Dear Sir:

Captain Robert Bateman's training critique of our CTCs is a "round out of impact!" I think he's both missed the basic point of why we take our units to the CTCs, and has been trapped in the current rage to change everything we do, whether it works or not. I don't think he's alone in his opinions. I respectfully suggest that he reflect just a little more on the goals of a CTC rotation, and, perhaps more importantly, the reasons why we do *not* go to the CTCs. Hopefully, he and his peers can learn these valuable lessons earlier in their careers than some of us did, and benefit. More importantly, their soldiers can benefit. Captain Bateman, and others as appropriate, I suggest to you that:

CTC Rotations **are** about:

- **Training for the Tactical Fight.** Training companies/troops and battalion task forces/squadrons to fight and win (at the tactical level) the most demanding of battles against a dedicated, professional, and determined enemy under the worst case scenarios imaginable. To fight and win the most perilous battles, when we're outnumbered, outgunned, and alone.

- **Training for the Present.** Training units to fight and win America's battles that we might face next month or next year, with the equipment and capabilities we have today, not in some visionary future fight.

- **Learning to Synchronize.** Training tactical leaders to efficiently synchronize their available combat power to avoid waste of any precious asset. Learning that efficient and disciplined wargaming for synchronization is hard and unglamorous work, but has a high payoff in the end. Learning that it's worth every minute we allocate to it!

- **Learning Hard Lessons.** Walking away just a little bit humbled and more dedicated to the process of training to fight and win the toughest of fights. Knowing that you went up against the best, on his turf, and got better in the process.

- **Feeling Accomplished.** Knowing that we took our soldiers and units to the CTC, trained hard and safe, and came home better prepared to fight and win.

CTC Rotations **are not** about:

- **Beating the OPFOR.** Go to a CTC with that goal uppermost in mind and you guarantee yourself disappointment. If, in the process of learning how to fight you win a few, consider it icing on the cake.

- **Equaling or Bettering the Record of a Previous Unit's Rotation.** Training to fight isn't that kind of competitive sport. The conditions change. Forget what they did and get focused on training *your* unit!

- **Teaching and Training Operational Art.** We have other tools to do that — simulations, CGSC, etc. Rest assured that our

battalion and brigade commanders will gladly opt to hit the enemy's rear and flank. If it's open to attack. If the higher mission permits. If, if, if.

- **Free Wheeling Cavalry Charges (Free Play).** We don't charge across the desert in a best-case scenario based on perfect intelligence and a semi-cooperative and outgunned enemy. We used to do that during the "olden days" of REFORGER. Looked good but was lousy training at the tactical level.

- **Training Units to Fight on a Digitized Tactical Battlefield that is still at best years away from reality.**

- **Feeling good.** Puffing our chests out, based on the accomplishment of easy missions.

That, Captain Bateman, is what I believe CTC rotations are all about, and what they are not about. By all means, keep thinking deep. Keep thinking about the future fight and how to train for it. Just don't lose focus on the close battle/today's battle in the process! You and other leaders of your generation might have to conduct that lousy deliberate attack against a prepared defense tomorrow, without the aid of intelligence, air, naval, or ground combat power supremacy. What then? Learn to synchronize on the fly? I don't think so.

Oh, and by the way, CTCs, keep up the great work!

O.T. EDWARDS
LTC, Armor
HQ, ACE MOBILE FORCE (LAND)

Battlespace and the XO's Role

Dear Sir:

I read with great interest 1LT(P) Peck's passionate arguments concerning the tank company XO's role and his direct refutation of my points in his article, "The Tank XO...2IC or TOC-IC," in the May-June 1997 issue. He directly states that I "...could not have been more wrong." My spouse of one year has also stated that point on several occasions, giving the phrase an air of familiarity. Therefore, 1LT Peck's directly stated point, through no fault of his own, had a dull edge to it. Nevertheless, had I been assigned to argue his point, I would have said the same thing, if not more loudly. In fact, I agree.

I can safely make that statement because I was not making the point against which 1LT Peck is arguing. If we agree that the tank company's entire battlespace CAN be seen (I assume he means with direct eyesight) as he so states on page 23, then I certainly agree that the XO should be in a tank. However, that was not the point I was making in reference to digitization's effect on the tank company and its potential on the future battlefield. A digitally-equipped

tank company, especially one with far-target designation capability like the M1A2, will operate over more physical space, and thus, will have a greatly expanded battlespace. If you include this unit's enhanced capability to integrate other combat multipliers into the equation, the battlespace will correspondingly increase also. Does 1LT Peck really think that all of this will be within direct eyesight of either the tank company CO or XO?

This is where his argument misses the point. He assumes that I contend the tank's direct capabilities are dictating roles. My point is that digitization and its corresponding capability to improve the unit's situational awareness will improve and expand the battle of the tank company; the M1A2 only serves as a tool to make that call. In order to fully take advantage of this improved capability, the XO best assists the commander from a C2V rather than a tank as I stated in my article. Hence, my analogy using the current role of the cavalry troop XO as an example for the future tank company XO. In effect, digitization will change the XO's role, not the tank, insofar as it affects his ability to deal with the demands of digitization.

I believe my argument is also consistent with situational awareness theory, which comprises three hierarchical levels: Level 1 is "perception of the environment;" Level 2 is "comprehension of the environment;" Level 3 is "projection of future status." I contend that an XO operating from a tank will only achieve Level 1 at best, while the capabilities inherent in a C2V will allow him (and hence the company) to reach the other levels. This is why it is imperative to have a C2V vehicle at the company level, manned by the XO, to assist the commander in integrating other combat multipliers across an expanded tank company battlespace. The company itself will have more potential in this way.

If nothing else, this professional exchange between myself and 1LT Peck should serve as one point that must be addressed in defining the role of the tank company XO and how he is equipped as the Army enters the twenty-first century.

MAJ KEVIN D. POLING
CTAC-CGSC
Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.

Crusader Queries

Dear Sir:

I was very pleased to receive several magazines from my U.S. contact and AR-MOR contributor 1LT Adam Geibel, including your March-April 1997 edition.

While I have not had time to read and enjoy the magazine in full, one item caught my eye straight away. The article "British Tradition vs. German Innovation" by MAJ David

P. Cavaleri includes an illustration of a British Crusader tank being tested at Fort Knox. The caption contains two points I would like to comment on before adding an anecdote which you may find interesting.

First of all, the tank is stated to be armed with a 37mm cannon, when in common with most British tanks of that era it mounted a 2pdr or 40mm gun. One Crusader which did carry a 37mm is the surviving vehicle at Puckapunyal in Australia, which tank was refitted with a U.S. built gun for display purposes as its own weapon was removed to be used in an Australian armored car project during the war years. By 1942, the date of the photo, new British tanks were being fitted with the 6pdr gun, also used as the M1 series in U.S. service as a towed anti-tank piece.

Crusader is also said to have riveted armor, which is not totally correct as the turret was made up of an inner, welded shell to which the main armor plates were riveted. This reduced the effect of rivets being forced into the tank if directly struck by a projectile. The same construction was used on the Conqueror, which carried a very similar turret to the Crusader — and which would have been the first all-welded British tank, had there not been a shortage of trained welders more urgently needed to build ships in 1940 — and also on the later Cavalier, Centaur, and Crusader, the last of which served in the North West European campaign in 1944-45. Its replacement, the Comet, was an all-welded design but did not see action until early 1945, the date of introduction being delayed by the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes.

Visible in the photo is the small sub-turret next to the driver and mounting a single machine gun. This was of doubtful value. When the Crusader was being tested in later 1940/early 1941, it was found that firing four 225-round belts of ammunition consecutively through this machine gun resulted in the unfortunate gunner becoming unconscious and needing oxygen to revive him, the driver being unfit to drive, while even the main turret crew complained of headaches. Many of the Crusaders used in North Africa operated with this turret unmanned, as much due to crew shortages as safety. The sub-turret was deleted on later Crusaders.

One small point I would like clarification on should someone be able to help: The vehicle in the photo has a number painted on its turret, but the print is not clear enough to make it out. I would be interested to know what it actually is as I am engaged in a long-term — too long! — study of British armor including these census numbers, and would like to place this tank in its rightful order. Identification of whether the tank was a Mk I or a Mk II would also help, although its number would point in the right direction. [Ed. Note - The number on the turret is T16636.]

Also, what became of the reports produced on these trials? The trials included several British vehicles including, I under-

stand, another Crusader, a later Mk III vehicle with a 6pdr gun which is currently being refurbished at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. The test results and comments on these vehicles would be very interesting, if anyone can point me to their location.

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Personnel System Drives Good People Out of the Active Army, and the Guard

Dear Sir:

Major Donald Vandergriff's article in the March-April 1997 issue of *ARMOR*, "Creating the Officer Corps of the Future to Execute Force XXI Blitzkrieg," could not have more clearly outlined the shortfalls of today's U.S. Army Armor Officer Corps personnel system for both the active duty and National Guard ranks. His proposal to reform the whole system is the only viable solution that would ensure we have a combat-ready armor force to execute Force XXI Blitzkrieg doctrine. For this reason, the Department of the Army should implement these changes as soon as possible.

Over half of the armor lieutenants with whom I served in 4-66 Armor Battalion during Operation Desert Storm left active duty or the military altogether within three years of returning to Europe from the war. Why did so many battle-tested, young armor officers leave the Army, taking with them to the civilian sector the combat experience they had learned in the Middle East? Because they were fed up with poor leadership and lack of support that is characteristic of our up-or-out and no-fault armor officer personnel system.

When, in 1992, I left active duty for the civilian sector, I sought to put behind me the up-or-out and no-fault armor officer system while pursuing a part-time military career in the Texas Army National Guard's 49th Armored Division. Unfortunately, I very quickly found that the structure of the National Guard's Armor Officer Corps is in even worse shape than its active duty counterpart. Most National Guard armor officers, many of whom are not qualified to lead troops out the front door of their armory, constantly vie for leadership and command positions not based upon their competence but by using the good ol' boy system and Machiavellian politics. It is no coincidence, therefore, that so many good National Guard armor officers, as well as their enlisted subordinates, are leaving the military service for the same reason their active duty brethren are — the armor personnel system is broken.

The only way the Army can ensure it has the qualified and competent tank officers

needed to effectively implement Force XXI Blitzkrieg doctrine is to limit armor command slots to real leaders, put only qualified and caring managers into armor staff and support positions, and rid the armor officer ranks of those who do not care or just do not belong. Likewise, the Army should quit trying to fund National Guard armor units and start putting all of its tank training funds into the active duty ranks where it belongs — with real tankers. The armor community, U.S. Army, and our nation as a whole desperately need and demand these changes. Our freedom ultimately depends upon it.

MICHAEL A. KELLY
CPT, AR, TXARNG

Leadership Development Demands The Chance to Try and Fail

Dear Sir:

I found MAJ Vandergriff's article ("Creating the Officer Corps of the Future...," Mar-Apr 97) to be provocative and controversial and on the right track. It should stimulate some interesting responses. For sure the Army needs to do something besides play around with technology and constant reorganizations that create endless and needless turmoil. We don't concentrate enough on leadership development, both for junior officers and NCOs. Seniors remain petrified that if one of their junior officers makes a mistake that it will terminate the senior's career. This has been true as long as I can remember, and obviously persists to this day. Consequently, juniors have few chances to show their stuff, but if they play ball, they do get promoted and then are qualified to do what? Play some more ball with higher-up seniors? I shudder to think what sort of an Army this will produce, especially when those at the top keep pretending that pushing females into every niche will be wonderful for combat readiness. So, pushing females and muzzling junior officers will... well, you should quickly get the picture!

I agree that the Army fails to recognize that there must be different career tracks and that not everyone is ready or willing to command others and all the responsibility this entails. Also agree that officers must remain in positions, especially command, for several years to become really proficient, and if this means that we cut back on senior positions, so be it. I believe that the OER system must emphasize what raters have done to provide juniors with opportunities to learn how to take the initiative when appropriate for particular positions and situations. If raters cannot truly develop leaders, what the hell good are they? We simply must expand the risk tolerance factors of seniors to encourage their juniors to tackle difficult tasks and accept the mistakes that go with them... So far we've done a lousy job for a

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number of reasons... but one major element is the concentration on high tech solutions that thus overload our soldiers with gear that probably will be too difficult to operate under great stress in terrible weather and humidity and hard to maintain and support. When all this fancy equipment fails, and it surely will at some point, what then?

For the good of the service, let's get back to the fundamentals of leadership development and relegate all this razzle dazzle equipment to secondary effort. How much high tech stuff did the Viet Cong have? What won that war?

COL GEORGE EDDY (Retired)
Via e-mail

Improving Scout Vehicle Capabilities

Dear Sir:

Over the years since the scouts traded in their horses for mounts of steel, there has been a running debate on the perfect reconnaissance vehicle. There have been several vehicles that have served American scouts in their quest to gain and maintain contact. The U.S. Army has used both tracked and wheeled vehicles that seemed to alternate with each new generation of scouts.

In World War II, American reconnaissance platforms were wheeled, with the M8 Scout Car and the venerable Jeep being the most widely used. The M8 was a six-wheeled vehicle based on the 2-1/2-ton truck chassis. It came with a turret which mounted a single shot 37mm cannon.

During the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army relied mostly on tracked vehicles for mounted reconnaissance, utilizing the M551 Sheridan and the diminutive M114. Tracked vehicles remained the primary mounts for scouts through the '70s and '80s, with the M113 and M901 improved TOW vehicle and the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle. In the late '80s, the Army started moving towards the idea of wheeled reconnaissance at the task force level. Currently the U.S. Army uses both tracked and wheeled scout platforms, with the M3A2 CFVs at divisional and regimental (3rd ACR) levels, and the M1025/6 HMMWV (Hummer) at the task force and light cavalry levels. The Experimental Brigade Reconnaissance Troop of 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division also utilizes the Hummer with two platoons of nine vehicles each.

Each of the current mounts has advantages and disadvantages when compared to each other. The HMMWV scout's main advantage is stealth. The Hummer is low profile and quiet. It is also easier to maintain and operate. The M3 CFV's main advantage is the sights which are slaved to a weapons system. A CFV platoon also has a greater ability to conduct mounted and dismounted reconnaissance simultaneously. Any future scout vehicle should encompass

each of the advantages of the current systems.

While the debate still rages as to whether tracked or wheeled is the best way to go for a scout vehicle, there are some basic requirements that I believe the FSV must possess.

- A stabilized, turreted weapons system that is capable of rapid, accurate fire. It must be of sufficient caliber to defeat current and near-future infantry fighting vehicles and reconnaissance platforms in a self-protection type of engagement. Given this, the armament should be of 25mm capability.

- Thermal imaging and day sights that are slaved to the weapons system.

- A crew of at least four scouts. This is needed for a greater continuous operations capability and a better dismounted ability than HMMWV scouts currently possess.

- Stealth. As previously stated, this is the HMMWV-equipped platoon's greatest advantage over the M3. The M3 is loud, large, and lethargic in low speed movement.

- Amphibious capability with very little preparation. This is an asset that neither vehicle possesses. While the M3 is amphibious, those of us that have put them in water know that it takes a great deal of preparation and they barely move in still water.

- Armor protection up to 14.5 mm and against shell fragments.

Recommendation:

While my personal prejudice is toward a fully tracked vehicle, the fiscal realities of the current Army budget would make this unlikely. Operating cost and vehicle price would be prohibitive given the relatively small number of vehicles that would be purchased. To hold down the cost, the design should be simple and incorporate as many current-use components as possible. It would be 6-wheeled so that it would have greater mobility than the Hummer and provide a better base for the turret. The turret should be a two man design with the commander and gunner. The turret should consist of composite materials to provide ballistic protection and still be light in weight.

The weapon system should be automatic, belt-fed with a rate of fire equal to the M242 Bushmaster 25mm. I would recommend the use of only armor-piercing discarding sabot-tracer rounds which would eliminate the need for a dual ammo feeder and reduce the weight of the system. It would also allow for a much simpler weapons design and be lower in cost, both per weapon and in maintenance, than the 25mm Bushmaster.

The vehicle should have a rear-mounted engine and an internal tire pressure system. The driver and the fourth scout would sit forward of the turret area. The height of the proposed vehicle should be no higher than the Hummer at hull level. It should also be no wider than the Hummer. Add an M240 coaxial mounted machine gun and we have, in my opinion, an excellent vehicle for re-

connaissance as well as convoy support and other uses.

In closing, the possible Army-wide adoption of Brigade Recon Troops along with the 2d ACR (Light) means that we need a future scout vehicle to perform scout missions as soon as possible. The HMMWV currently cannot provide scouts with the abilities they need to be successful, and the M3 cannot be utilized in light cavalry organizations. By combining the advantages that each of these vehicles possess, we can quickly design and produce the Future Scout Vehicle. "He who wins the recon fight, wins the battle."

Scouts Out!

SFC MONTY A. MILLER
Scout PSG
Ft. Hood, Texas

LAVs Might Meet the Need For Firepower in Light Cav Units

Dear Sir:

Mr. Crist's article, "Too Late the XM8," and LTC Benson's "Whither the 2d Cavalry" pose a serious question. With the cancellation of the Armored Gun System, what options are available for both the 2d ACR and other units which have a need for a light tank?

An answer which should be explored is buying an off-the-shelf vehicle such as the LAV with a 105mm gun turret. This vehicle would have sufficient firepower to meet mission needs with high mobility. It could be air-dropped and would complement our force structure. Ideal companion vehicles to a large gun, turreted LAV would also include the turreted mortar, air defense, and APC variants. Such vehicles would give us a force that is air transportable with significant combat power. LAV-type vehicles are currently operated by many of our allies and the LAV itself is operated by the Marine Corps and several states.

The 2d ACR and our light forces fill a significant role in our overall force structure. The 2d itself bridges that gap between light and heavy by having a force structure that combines mobility, deployability, and firepower. We must provide them with the equipment necessary to fulfill their missions.

ROBERT J. PARR
SFC, WAARNG
Co A, 1-303rd Armor, 81st SIB

Changes at the Patton Museum

Dear Sir:

At its quarterly March meeting, the Board of Trustees of the Patton Museum elected

new officers and board members. MG (Ret.) Stan Sheridan will succeed COL (Ret.) Owsley Costlow as President. Owsley will continue to participate as a Member Emeritus. COL (Ret.) Don Williams will serve as Vice President and COL (Ret.) Don Appler and Mr. Lloyd Hillard, Jr., as Secretary and Treasurer respectively. New board members elected are Mr. Jack Milne; CSM (Ret.) John Stephens; MG, NGUS (Ret.) Elmer (Lew) Stephens; Mr. George P. Waters; and BG (Ret.) Thomas White. LTC (USAR) Robert Keats was elected as General Counsel.

General Sheridan views the current and continuing mission of the Board of Trustees as threefold: First, continued support of the Museum and its physical plant; second, to maintain and expand the Memorial Park adjacent to the Museum by raising funds to make it self-sustaining and, third, to build and sustain a 60-100,000 sq. ft. technology center to house, restore, exhibit, and study the 100+ combat vehicles dating from WWII that are now stored in condemned wooden buildings on post.

The Museum Board of Trustees will be seeking assistance from the entire Armor Community to support its efforts.

DONALD WILLIAMS
COL, USA (Ret.)
Trustee

DONALD E. APPLER
COL, USA (Ret.)
Trustee

All-around Virtual Vision System Is Still Not in Sight

Dear Sir:

The March-April 1997 *ARMOR* has on page 3 a letter from Mr. J. Migliaccio entitled "Main Gun on Elevating Pedestal Doesn't Solve 'Top Vision' Need." In the letter, Mr. Migliaccio makes the claim that only his conception for a 'virtual reality' vision system will give the 360° vision needed above the top of the gun mount.

He may be right on that, but he is wrong in his claim that such systems will be ready for production by 2010, simply because, according to him, the component and subsystem technology is 'available today.' If it doesn't exist today in a form that has been fully developed and integrated as a part of the vehicle system, which means it has been environmentally tested, demonstrated to be affordable and maintainable, meets volume/weight/cost constraints, then we don't know if it will ever be ready. The history of all development is full of broken dreams — and broken promises.

DON LOUGHLIN
Bellingham, Wash.